The Senate’s inquiry into corruption within the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) expresses the Nigerian government’s historical paradigm of structural corruption. It represents, beyond domestic fiscal considerations, a broad, credible threat to the legitimacy of governance, the corollaries of which are environmental insecurity and regional instability.
The Nigerian Senate has announced an official inquiry into the Niger Delta Development Commission’s (NDDC) Interim Management Committee. The mandate of the probe regards the investigation into the alleged fraudulent spending of N40 billion from January to March of 2020. The divers’ consequences of corruption and political chicanery within the NDDC are significant and multifaceted. There are corollaries of criminality within the commission. These include increased environmental insecurity in the Niger Delta and political instability that eventuates in militancy. The historical precedent of militants employing tactical insurgency throughout the littoral states of the delta in response to ecological degradation and gross developmental mismanagement represents substantial political, economic, and reputational risks.
The Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) was established in 2000 to promote and facilitate sustainable development within the region. The broad remit includes both policy prescription and implementation. Operationally, the NDDC was designed to function at the nexus of economic, social and ecological development. The objectives have, historically, been compromised by mismanagement and corruption. Whether the current inquiry into the NDDC can rectify these historical deficiencies is, presently, unknown.
The importance of sustainable development within the delta region cannot be overstated. The ecological future of the Niger Delta will be determined, to a significant extent, by the competing interests of regional governments, elites, and private oil companies. The mandate of the NDDC is to facilitate sustainable development while fostering local ecological regeneration and political amity between the myriad interested parties. This, mainly includes the federal government and the delta’s formidable militant organisations.
Therefore, though theoretically sound, in practice the NDDC’s mandate is persistently deficient. The Niger Delta, historically, through successive incarnations of governmental mismanagement and graft, absorbs unsustainable proportions of ecological degradation. The environmental disequilibrium inherent to natural resource extraction, specifically the production and transportation of oil, causes problems. It jeopardises both the collective economy of the delta states and the continued viability of sustainable subsistence for individual households.
Resource Capture in Niger Delta
The consequences of resource capture, defined, briefly, as a structural deficiency through which regional elites and kleptocratic government officials secure the majority of resources and the subsequent revenue generated, are varied and significant. In the short term, development is arrested due to inequitable distribution of resources, opportunity and income. The long term corollaries of resource capture include regional violence and diminishing foreign investment.
Additionally, environmental insecurity expresses itself through the variant contradictions and consequences of perpetual, extractive interactions with the Niger Delta’s ecosystem. It is furthered by the subsequent social instability and probability of reactive, tactical militancy. Corruption within the NDDC advances the perverse inequities engendered by “resource capture”. Resource capture is a seemingly axiomatic, cyclical construct of the delta. Local elites and exploitative governmental officials absorb, through flagrant wrongs, the accruing wealth generated by oil extraction. The unequal, externally directed distribution of oil revenue and the delta states’ lack of resource control are the omnipresent catalysts of insurgency and regional instability.
Corruption: Crisis of Legitimacy
Prebendalism, the malignant anachronism of colonisation, is still strikingly apparent across disparate sectors of the Nigerian state. And the legitimacy of regional governance is threatened by the lack of consistent regulatory oversight and institutional transparency. Therefore, the structural nature of governmental corruption defies a singular remedy. The broad remit of anti-graft agencies is often inadequate in addressing the fundamental causation of criminality and tempering its proliferation. The deficiency of regulatory instruments to mitigate endemic corruption across states and parastatals alike is represented on global transparency indices. In addition to claiming the position of 146th on the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, the Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) quantifies the marginal success of Nigerian governmental agencies at stanching corruption and ancillary iterations of criminality.
For instance, since the inception of civilian rule in 1999 and onward to 2004, federal statutory allocations to oil-producing states were exorbitant relative to non-oil producing countries. This trend suggests that the lack of budgetary transparency, the inefficacy of regulatory instruments and systemic corruption at state and federal levels represent the catalytic drivers behind the deficit of developmental expenditures within the NDDC.
Alternative Power Structures
Despite significant, annual appropriations, the failures of the NDDC to promote regional development are various and persistent. The inability of the commission to meet the stipulations of its mandate are demonstrated through its failure to educate the restive, regional youth population, and its unskilled attempts at constructing essential infrastructure. The enduring neglect of the Nigerian government and its mandated subsidiaries to provide rudimentary state services to delta residents augers the emergence of alternative, nongovernmental power structures.
Moreover, the administrative vacuum, observed in the absence of legitimate governance, fills with both endogenous and exogenous leadership structures. State militias, often composed of agitated youth, historically practice tactical insurgency. They often employ calculated extortive measures. The express objective is of acquiring developmental funding and resource control concessions from foreign oil companies or the federal government. Without a functioning, transparent NDDC there exists the expectation that foreign oil companies will fill the developmental lacuna. However, residents of the delta view such exogenous interventions and entities as invasive, unsustainable quasi solutions.
Militancy and Insurgency
Broadly, insurgency within the delta represents the tactical expression of a more comprehensive strategy pursuant of resource control, development projects and thoughtfully configured self-determination. Coordinated assaults by militants, specifically, attacks against riverine oil facilities, are extortive and ultimately deter expanding foreign investment and exogenous development assistance. The risk of reversion to previous rates of insurgency is immediate and significant. Militancy and counter-insurgency accounted for a high proportion of lethal conflict issues in the delta in 2019. Nascent, auxiliary militant factions, whether subordinate to established organisations or independent in function, represent appreciable risks to future security and investor confidence.
Nigeria’s population is predicted to expand to 400 million people by 2050, displacing the US from third place. This nearly unfettered growth over the next three decades necessarily invites and, indeed, requires foreign investment and development assistance. Abuja’s significant challenge, over the next decade, will be to construct a policy that addresses accelerating growth. Equitable resource distribution and expanded regulatory mechanisms, within the delta, are essential to assuring that regional population growth is sustainable. More broadly, Nigeria’s national policy should identify policy instruments that will efficiently harness the youth dividend and capture sustainable tax revenue.
The Nigerian state remains prebendal, and the corruption persistent within parastatals jeopardises such exogenous intervention. Corruption within the NDDC cannot only be isolated and appraised fiscally. It demands examination for its tangible social and reputational impact. Further, for the historical precedent of criminality beneath which it pursues or ignores its mandate.
The imminent danger is the affirmative finding of corruption within the NDDC by the senatorial inquiry. A verdict which harbours the potentiality to incite forays of militancy in the delta. Regional insurgency precipitates national instability. The extrapolation of insecurity culminates in negative reputational consequences. Western allies and international monetary institutions withdraw assistance and, potentially, diplomatic support.
Unmitigated ecological degradation is an eventuality well within the purview of the NDDC. It portends the apodictic concomitants of resource competition, forced migration and, ultimately, the vitiating of the delta’s fragile, extractive economy. Suspension of operations by international oil companies, irrespective of duration, decreases statutory development allocations to the delta and discourages novel, private ventures in the region.
In conclusion, until the federal government can consistently and successfully temper Nigeria’s polyvalent corruption, specifically within the NDDC and adjacent parastatals, the only inevitable outcome for investors is uncertainty.